Mergers and Acquisitions by Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Mergers and Acquisitions
Volume Author/Editor: Alan J. Auerbach, ed.




Chapter Title: The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions
Chapter Author: Alan J. Auerbach, David Reishus
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5822
Chapter pages in book: (p. 69 - 86)4  The Impact of  Taxation on 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus 
4.1  Introduction 
Throughout the recent wave of mergers, there has been no 
shortage of  explanations for the increase in activity in the 
market for corporate control. Some explanations emphasize 
the positive role that mergers and takeovers play in the allo- 
cation of resources in society. For example, corporate acqui- 
sitions may lead to the replacement of a poor management 
team; they may facilitate the contraction of  an industry in 
which  no firm  would voluntarily  adopt a reduction in size; 
they may generate synergies through the combination of com- 
plementary resources. 
Yet  clearly there are also explanations that have negative 
implications for social welfare. The most obvious, of course, 
is a reduction in the level of competition in a market. The tax 
motive has also been mentioned frequently. To the extent that 
corporations and their shareholders reap windfall gains via tax 
reductions, the Treasury may be unintentionally subsidizing 
takeover activity that must be paid for by others in the fiscal 
system. It is noteworthy, however, that combining firms may 
also facilitate more efficient behavior on their own part by 
reducing their taxes. For example, wiping out tax losses may 
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increase the firm’s incentive to invest, particularly when new 
investment brings  large,  immediate depreciation deductions 
and investment tax credits that can only be used by the tax- 
paying firm.’ Moreover, the tax reductions that occur may not 
be appropriately described as windfalls. For example, if firms 
incurring tax losses are regularly targeted for takeovers, then 
many firms might be encouraged to take risks that result in 
such losses. 
Whether tax incentives that encourage merger activity are 
desirable or not, it is important to know what their impact is. 
The U.S. income tax  at the individual  and corporate level 
imposes an extremely complicated set of provisions for merg- 
ers and acquisitions; the tax system is certainly not neutral in 
this area. But do taxes really  play a significant role in the 
merger decision? Congress appears to have concluded that 
they do, having adopted provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 that would limit the tax benefits from firm combinations. 
Yet there has been surprisingly little research on this question. 
This paper summarizes our own work to date on the topic. 
While we cannot offer definite conclusions, our preliminary 
results suggest that: 
Many mergers and acquisitions provide an opportunity 
for corporations and their shareholders to receive some tax 
benefits. 
In a small minority of cases, these benefits are large in 
comparison to the value of the acquired company, suggesting 
that taxes provided motivation. 
Even in cases where there are significant tax benefits, 
there is no strong evidence that they were the driving factors 
in the takeovers. 
Once again, we must stress the tentative nature of our con- 
clusions. We  have not found that tax factors do not matter. 
But there is still a lack of convincing evidence that they are 
an important determinant of merger activity in the aggregate. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will briefly  discuss the 
potential tax benefits from mergers and acquisitions. Then we 
will  describe  our research  on the  importance of  these  tax 
benefits to U.S. mergers and acquisitions  during the period 
from 1968 to 1983. 
1. 
2. 
3. 71  The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions 
4.2  Taxes and Merger Activity 
There are several different ways that companies may reduce 
taxes through a merger or acquisition, and tax benefits  can 
accrue at both the corporate and the shareholder levels. How- 
ever, in some cases the tax benefits from a corporate combi- 
nation are also available by other means, and such benefits 
should not be attributed to the merger process alone. 
4.2.1  Shareholder Taxation 
Shareholders of an acquired corporation can receive many 
forms of  payment  when  they  sell their  shares as part of  a 
merger or acquisition. Such receipts may be deemed taxable 
or nontaxable. If they are taxable, then the shareholders must 
pay capital gains taxes on their gain over basis.  If  they are 
not taxable, then shareholders need pay no taxes until they 
sell the shares in the acquiring company that they receive as 
payment. The latter treatment is clearly preferable to the for- 
mer from the perspective of the acquired firm’s shareholders. 
It may also represent a net gain to shareholders relative to the 
no-takeover situation; they may be less likely to sell their shares 
in the new company and incur capital gains taxes than they 
would have been had no acquisition occurred. For example, if 
a small company is bought out by a large, diversified one, ma- 
jor shareholders in the acquired firm would have less need to sell 
some of their holdings to obtain portfolio diversification. 
In exchange for the benefits obtained through avoidance of 
capital gains taxes, there are costs. To  avoid taxes at the in- 
dividual level, the corporate combination must qualify as a 
reorganization; that places certain restrictions on the trans- 
action. Among the most important are that the consideration 
paid to shareholders in the acquired company be voting stock, 
and that the acquired corporation’s  tax attributes be taken 
over by  the acquiring company. This  severely restricts the 
ability of the acquiring company to use cash in the acquisition 
process, or to obtain the tax advantages associated with step- 
ping up  asset bases of  the acquired company’s assets. We 
discuss the latter problem further on. 
Indeed, the use of cash might be attractive to the acquiring 
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cash because it is relatively  easy to use in a hostile tender 
offer. However, cash might also be attractive for tax purposes. 
An  acquiring corporation with sufficient cash for a trans- 
action will have the funds available for distribution to its share- 
holders instead if  it does not use the cash for the acquisition. 
These funds can be distributed in  two ways:  dividends and 
share repurchases. Dividends result in taxes which would be 
higher for shareholders of the parent firm than the capital gains 
taxes paid by  the acquired firm’s shareholders in a taxable 
transaction. Thus, a taxable cash transaction would result in 
lower combined personal taxes on the two firms’ shareholders 
than a nontaxable stock transaction combined with an increase 
in dividends. 
But firms can also repurchase their shares, and if  they do 
so, the tax advantage of  using cash in the acquisition would 
disappear. For many years, economists have been puzzled by 
the unwillingness of most corporations to use the repurchase 
route to reduce the taxes paid by their shareholders. In recent 
years, repurchases have become quite substantial, but this was 
not true historically. Thus, the existence of a net shareholder 
tax advantage in a cash acquisition rests on the theory that 
corporations find it easier to purchase other firm’s shares for 
cash than their own. 
In summary, nontaxable stock transactions may produce a 
tax benefit by allowing shareholders in the acquired company 
to attain a more diversified portfolio without realizing their 
shares and paying capital gains taxes. But such transactions 
may limit the size of corporate level tax benefits. Taxable cash 
transactions offer a tax advantage to shareholders only to the 
extent that they facilitate the transmission of cash out of the 
acquiring corporation at capital gains rates. 
4.2.2  Corporate Taxation 
At the corporate level, the tax treatment of  a merger or 
acquisition depends on whether the acquiring firm elects to 
treat the acquired firm as being absorbed into the parent with 
its tax attributes intact, or first being liquidated and then re- 
ceived in the form of  its component assets. As indicated ear- 
lier, a tax-free reorganization must follow the first path, while 
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form of transaction has potential tax benefits but it is important 
to determine what benefits might have been available even in 
the absence of a merger. 
Acquiring a firm as a collection of assets allows a stepped- 
up basis  for the assets, with  assets that are depreciable or 
depletable then receiving higher allowances than would oth- 
erwise have been permitted. Prior to 1987 the liquidating target 
company (and therefore, its new parent) avoided capital gains 
taxes that would have been due on the simple sale of assets. 
This  benefit  occurred  through  the  “General  Utilities  Doc- 
trine,”  which allowed liquidating distributions of property to 
shareholders (in this case, corporate shareholders) to be made 
without the payment of capital gains taxes by the liquidating 
corporation (the acquired  firm, in this  case). For some as- 
sets, such as machinery and equipment, this was not a major 
benefit, since gains would still be subject to the recapture of 
ordinary income taxes previously deferred through the use of 
accelerated depreciation. For others, however, such as busi- 
ness  structures  and  mineral  property,  the  gain  could  be 
substantial. 
When an acquiring firm takes over the tax attributes of the 
acquired company, it does not get the opportunity to step up 
asset bases. It does get the benefit of any unused tax credits 
or tax losses that the target firm has carried forward, plus any 
“built-in”  tax losses that the target will incur in the future. 
Such built-in losses occur in a corporation whose assets have 
high basis and projected depreciation allowances but little pro- 
ductive value. The use of such tax benefits is limited by various 
sections of  the Internal Revenue Code that require the ac- 
quisition to have economic substance and also require either 
the continuation of  the target’s operations (in the case of  a 
taxable transaction) or restrictions on the extent to which 
losses can be used (based on the relative sizes of acquired and 
acquiring companies). 
Even with these restrictions  and despite the existence of 
other channels such as leasing, the parent firm may be better 
able to use these tax benefits than the target firm would have 
on its own. This is confirmed in Auerbach and Poterba (1986), 
who suggest that firms with unused tax benefits in a given year 
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However the assets and tax attributes of the acquired com- 
pany are treated, an additional tax benefit may be obtained if 
the acquiring company has unused tax losses and credits: it 
may  set these  against the otherwise  taxable  income of  the 
company it acquires. Restrictions on this practice are weaker 
than those on using the tax benefits of the acquired company. 
For example, the rule limiting the use of tax benefits in re- 
organizations would have no effect except in the very unlikely 
event that the acquiring company were much smaller than the 
taxable company it acquired. 
A final tax incentive at the corporate level that may lead to 
mergers and acquisitions is the deductibility of  interest  on 
corporate borrowing. Since the interest deduction is always 
available to corporations, there must be some reason why an 
acquisition enhances its attractiveness. We can think of at least 
two reasonable explanations. First, target management might 
be overly cautious about borrowing, either because of its own 
interests or because of its fear of adverse shareholder reaction. 
The untapped tax gain available through additional use of debt 
capacity could motivate an acquiring company.  Second, by 
integrating different operations, merging corporations could 
reduce business risk and make it possible for the combined 
entity to borrow more than the two companies could prudently 
borrow separately. 
In  summary, there are clear tax benefits  available  at the 
corporate level in the form of stepped-up asset bases and the 
increased utilization of tax losses and tax credits. There may 
also be gains from increased borrowing capacity, though here 
the benefits are more problematic. 
4.3  Empirical Findings 
To  evaluate the magnitude of the tax benefits from mergers 
and acquisitions, we compiled a sample of large mergers and 
acquisitions that occurred between  1968 and  1983. Our col- 
lection method and public data sources are described in our 
earlier study (Auerbach and Reishus  1986). Most of  our ob- 
servations fell between the mid-1970s and 1982. Much of what 
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yet focused on the very recent wave of merger activity, for 
which data have only recently become available. 
In our sample of 318 mergers and acquisitions, the average 
capitalized value of  the acquiring company (before the ac- 
quisition) was just under $2 billion, with the acquired com- 
panies having an average capitalization of just over $200 mil- 
lion. There was relatively little difference in financial structure 
between the two groups, with the ratio of long-term debt to 
long-term debt plus equity (at market value)  averaging 29.7 
percent for acquiring firms and 27.4 percent for those acquired. 
A majority of the firms in the sample are in manufacturing: 
65 percent of the targets and 74 percent of the parents. Of the 
remaining companies, 23  firms in energy and mining explo- 
rations were acquired, 10 of them by companies in the same 
industry. Only  1  company in energy and mining acquired a 
company outside the industry. Likewise in the transportation 
industry, where there were  19 parents and 21  targets,  13 of 
the mergers involved 2 firms in the industry. The same general 
pattern was observed in the financial industry, where, of the 
16 acquired companies and 16 acquiring companies, 10  were 
matched. 
4.3.1  Tax Losses and Credits 
Under present law, a company which incurs a tax loss in 
the current year has two options. If  it had sufficient taxable 
income in the three previous tax years to offset the current 
loss, it may carry the loss back to the earlier years and obtain 
an immediate refund. If it does not have enough recent income 
to do this for all of its current loss, it must carry the rest of 
the loss forward. Likewise with tax credits, the firm may have 
to carry unused credits forward if  accrued credits exceed a 
certain fraction of  the firm’s taxable income before credits. 
The disadvantage of carrying losses and credits forward is that 
they do not earn any interest and they may expire. In addition, 
firms with liquidity constraints lose the immediate cashflow 
that such benefits would deliver. 
Table 4.1 presents a cross tabulation that is useful in con- 
sidering the potential importance of tax losses and credits in 
motivating mergers. In the table, we classify both acquired 76  Alan J. AuerbacWDavid Reishus 
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Table 4.1  Mergers by  Tax Status 
Target Grout, 
Parent Group  1  2  3  4  Total 
I  199  20  13  28  260 
2  7  0  3  3  13 
3  19  2  4  0  25 
4  9  3  0  8  20 
Total  234  25  20  39  318 
Notes: Group 1 firms have positive tax payments. 
Group 2 firms have negative tax payments but no carryforwards. 
Group 3 firms have tax credits but not losses carried forward. 
Group 4 firms have loss carryforwards. 
Twelve firms have both positive tax payments and tax loss carryforwards, usually 
due to a subsidiary not consolidated for tax purposes (primarily life insurance sub- 
sidiaries). These firms have been classified on a case-by-case basis. 
and acquiring companies into one of four categories according 
to their tax status in the last completed tax year before the 
merger or acquisition. These categories are: 
Taxable; the firms paid federal income taxes and did 
not have any losses or tax credits carried forward. Such firms 
can use other firms’ tax benefits to shelter income. 
Not taxable, but also without any losses or credits car- 
ried forward. This happens when businesses can carry all their 
current losses and credits back  to an  earlier, taxable  year. 
Such firms offer no obvious tax shelter benefits to other firms, 
but neither are they likely to want to obtain such benefits to 
shelter their own income. 
Tax credits, but not losses, carried forward. These firms 
are either currently taxable or are carrying all losses back, but 
they have tax credits they cannot use. 
Tax credits and losses carried forward. These firms are 
currently not taxable and must carry losses as well as crediits 
forward. 
For tax losses and credits to be of potential importance as 
incentives for merger activity, three conditions must be sat- 
isfied. First, these  benefits  must be present in a  significant 
number of cases. Second, firms must have combined according 
to a pattern in which those with benefits (groups 3 and 4)  joined 
those who  could  make use  of  them  (group  1). Finally,  the 
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As table 4.1 shows, the first of these conditions is satisfied. 
Out of a total of 636 firms involved in the 318 mergers (some 
of which appear more than once in the list), 104 were in group 
3 or group 4. The second condition is also satisfied: there were 
69 combinations of a group 1 firm with a firm from group 3 or 
4. At the same time, the fact that  12 of the mergers and ac- 
quisitions occurred between tax-constrained firms (4 between 
firms in group 3 and 8 between firms in group 4) indicates the 
importance of nontax factors in the merger decision. Most of 
these combinations of  tax-constrained companies were hori- 
zontal, within a single industry, where one would expect the 
fortunes of firms to be closely tied together. 
To  consider the third condition, that these benefits be eco- 
nomically significant, we can refer to table 4.2. In the cases 
where there were tax benefits available, we estimated their 
size as their value to the taxable firm in terms of the present 
value of taxes saved through the use of the existing tax losses 
and credits carried forward. As a fraction of the market value 
of the acquired company, the average gain was 13.7 percent, 
or 9.0 percent  when  weighted  by  the  size of  the acquired 
company. The (weighted) average gain was larger in the mi- 
nority of  cases where the tax losses and credits came from 
the acquiring company than from the acquired company: 14.3 
percent versus 5.5 percent of the value of  the acquired com- 
Table 4.2  Potential Gains from Tax  Benefit Transfer (as a percentage of 
target firm’s market value) 
Number of Mergers with 
Potential Gain from:  Target  Parent  Total 






277  293  252 
20  8  28 
7  5  12 
11  6  17 
3  6  9 
Average Gain 
(of those with positive gain) 
Unweighted 
Weighted 
12.7  15.4  13.7 
5.5  14.3  9.0 78  Alan J. AuerbacWDavid Reishus 
pany. Although these were the average gains for the 20.7 per- 
cent of  mergers in which some benefits were available, the 
gains exceed 10 percent of the market value of the target in 
8.1 percent of all mergers, or 39 percent of those with some 
gains present. 
Thus, we found that benefits from the increased use of tax 
losses and unused credits were present in about 20 percent of 
the mergers and acquisitions in our sample. In about 8 percent 
of the overall sample, the benefits were significant (at least 10 
percent of  the acquired company’s market value). We  must 
now ask the most difficult question: how many of these com- 
binations occurred because of the available tax benefits? This 
is the subject of our continuing research, so we cannot offer 
clear answers yet. However, there are two pieces of evidence 
that shed light on the question. 
First, the number of firms with tax losses involved in merg- 
ers and acquisitions in recent years has been large, but so has 
the incidence  of  tax losses among firms in  general. In our 
sample, of 37 mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 1982 
and  1983 (for which we use tax data at the end of  1981 and 
1982, respectively), 8 involved either a parent or a target with 
tax losses (that is, in group 4).  In a comparable sample of large 
firms not limited to those involved in mergers, Auerbach and 
Poterba (1986) found that 7.6 percent had tax losses carried 
forward at the end of 1981 and 12.0 percent had losses carried 
forward at the end of  1982. The pure chance of a loss being 
present among either parent or target is thus roughly equal to 
that actually observed in the sample.* 
Second, there is little evidence that among merging firms, 
the form of the combination depended on whether there were 
tax losses and credits available.  If tax motivations were im- 
portant,  one might  expect  to observe a greater number  of 
nontaxable transactions among mergers with the potential for 
transferring tax benefits; these are cases in which the potential 
for stepping up asset bases, available  only through taxable 
transactions, would be of little value. Yet our statistical anal- 
ysis (described in the appendix) has failed to detect any sig- 
nificant connection between the type of transaction (taxable 
or nontaxable) and the presence and size of these tax benefits. 79  The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions 
We  must conclude, on the basis of our evidence, that while 
the utilization of tax credits and tax losses could play an im- 
portant  role in  affecting merger activity, there is no strong 
evidence that it does. 
4.3.2  Basis Step-up 
There are a small number of celebrated cases in recent years 
where the step-up of  asset bases supposedly played an im- 
portant role in the acquisition process. Our estimates-of the 
potential tax benefits  from this channel (described in more 
detail in our earlier paper) are based on calculations of  the 
total basis  step-up that could be  achieved on assets of  the 
acquired firm not subject to recapture. The results suggested 
that this was not likely to be as important a benefit to merging 
firms as the utilization  of  unused tax losses and credits. In 
only seven cases could we identify gains in excess of 5 percent 
of the market value of the acquired firm. 
Our statistical analysis also failed to support the notion that 
firms with sizeable potential gains from stepping up asset bases 
would be more likely to choose a taxable transaction in order 
to take advantage of these gains. However, we have less con- 
fidence in these conclusions than those reached above because 
we  doubt our ability  to accurately measure the gains from 
stepping up asset bases.  The detailed asset information re- 
quired for such calculations is not normally available publicly. 
The little public information that does exist supports the 
conclusion that basis step-up is not typically important in larger 
mergers. One source says that of the 100 largest acquisitions 
since 1982 only 17  have elected to use the basis step-up, and 
the value of assets involved represents a smaller 13 percent 
of the total (Mergers and Acquisitions,  1986). 
4.3.3  Leverage 
As we indicated above, the tax deductibility of interest de- 
ductions in itself is not an incentive to merge. It is an incentive 
to borrow. Yet, there may be changes associated with merging 
that make borrowing less costly to the firm in some respect. 
One may certainly ask whether firms that merge borrow more. 80  Alan J. AuerbacWDsvid Reishus 
Given the publicity that this topic has received, we were 
surprised to find that they do not. In our sample, we measured 
the debt-capital ratios  (measured at market value)  of  firms 
before and after merger, comparing the combined ratio for the 
separate companies two years before the merger or acquisition 
to that of the single entity two years after the transaction. We 
chose to distance the dates of measurement from the merger 
date to avoid characterizing a very temporary increase in debt 
around the merger date as a change in underlying  financial 
structure. 
We  found that the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt 
plus equity increased in our sample from an average (weighted 
by size of firm) of 25.4 percent to one of 26.7 percent. This is 
not a very important increase given that it occurred during a 
period  of generally rising debt-equity ratios. Where the ac- 
quired company’s market value was relatively large, between 
25 and 50 percent of the size of the acquiring company, there 
was actually a decline in the debt-equity ratio. This is contrary 
to what one might expect for mergers with large capital re- 
quirements. It is important to stress that these mergers did 
involve increases in debt outstanding, but also in equity value. 
It has been well documented that, taken together, the market 
values of the two involved companies increase through merger 
(for example, Jensen and Ruback 1983). Our estimates merely 
suggest that borrowing did not outstrip growth in value. If the 
recent merger wave involved increases in leverage in the ag- 
gregate, then this represents a deviation from recent historical 
performance. 
4.3.4  Individual Tax Factors 
We  indicated that a nontaxable transaction could lessen the 
capital gains tax  burden for shareholders of  acquired  com- 
panies. It is difficult to know what this burden would be with- 
out a detailed list of shareholder tax rates and holding periods. 
As  a  rough  measure  of  the potential  benefit  of  avoiding  a 
taxable transaction, we used the percentage increase in the 
acquired firm’s market value in the two years preceding the 
merger or acquisition. We found statistically that this measure 
had no impact on the decision between taxable and nontaxable 
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The potential tax benefits from using cash in a merger hinge 
on the acquiring corporation’s being in need of a way to get 
excess cash out of  the corporation without  subjecting it to 
dividend taxes. It is difficult to identify which firm, if any, had 
this motivation, but we can identify some that probably did 
not:  those that had issued new equity in the two years im- 
mediately preceding the merger or acquisition. It is hard to 
imagine any reason why such a firm, having recently obtained 
an infusion of cash through the sale of shares, would then seek 
to reduce its internal cash position. Indeed, we found this to 
be one factor that did statistically influence the form of the 
transaction. Firms that had recently issued new equity were 
less likely to engage in a cash transaction; perhaps the method 
of  payment in acquisitions does play a role in helping firms 
regulate their internal holdings of cash.3 
4.4  Conclusions 
Our results suggest that, for mergers and acquisitions in the 
1970s and early  1980s between large public corporations in 
the United States, the potential transfer of unused tax credits 
and tax losses was the most significant potential tax-related 
factor. This was particularly  so in cases where the benefits 
were used by an acquiring company to shelter the income of 
acquired taxable companies.  The benefits from stepping up 
asset bases are less discernible.  Likewise, purported gains 
from increasing leverage appear to be refuted by the stability 
of debt-equity ratios measured before and after mergers. 
Even where potential tax benefits have been identified, we 
have not  yet found any evidence that they have played  an 
important role in the structure and frequency of mergers and 
acquisitions.  However,  further  research  on  this  matter  is 
needed before more definite conclusions may be drawn. 
Appendix 
The value and type of tax benefits available to firms would be 
expected to affect not only the incentive to merge but also, 
once the decision to merge has been made, the legal form of 82  Alan J. AuerbacWDavid Reishus 
the merger. The choice of stock or cash as the means of pay- 
ment, and the decision of whether to have a taxable combi- 
nation or a tax-free reorganization, should be influenced by 
various tax aspects. 
These tax incentives were discussed more fully in the body 
of the paper, but can be summarized here by the following 
hypotheses. 
High premiums paid, or low shareholder bases in the 
acquired stock, should lead to the use of stock as a form of 
payment. This defers the capital gains tax that would other- 
wise be payable by those selling their shares in the acquired 
company. 
Low book value of depreciable or depletable assets rel- 
ative to market value should encourage a taxable transaction 
to take advantage of basis step-up.  Since nontaxable trans- 
actions require the use of stock, we would expect to see cash 
used more often when book values are high relative to market 
value. 
3.  The presence of substantial tax loss and/or credit car- 
ryforwards on the targets’ books would encourage the use of 
these credits and thus make nontaxable stock transactions 
more likely. 
The use of cash should be greater where acquiring firms 
have not needed to go to the market for new equity funds, and 
less where firms have an apparent desire to disburse cash from 
the corporate form. 
In  order to test these  hypotheses,  we performed  a logit 
analysis where the choice of cash or stock as the means of 
payment was the dependent variable. For 241 of the 318 merg- 
ers in our sample we were unambiguously able to determine 
the means of payment. These included 128 stock (nontaxable), 
106 cash (taxable), and 7 stock (taxable). The remaining trans- 
actions included  mixtures of  stock and cash.  Since so few 
stock transactions were taxable, we focused on the choice 
between  taxable  cash  and  nontaxable  stock  transactions. 
Within this subsample, one would expect cash to occur more 
frequently with  low locked-in  capital gains of  the acquired 
stock, high basis step-up potential, low tax loss and credit 
benefits from the target, and excess cash held by the parent. 
Our measure of the locked-in capital gains is crude and was 
1. 
2. 
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statistically insignificant. The remaining hypotheses may be 
evaluated using table 4.3, which presents results typical of the 
regressions we performed. 
We  tried three different measures of the available tax gains 
from the basis step-up at the corporate level. The first, de- 
scribed in the appendix of Auerbach and Reishus (1986), is 
based on an estimate of the difference between market and 
book values of business structure. The second is based on the 
difference between market value and book value of the firm, 
and the third  is based  on the accumulated  deferred taxes, 
which to some extent reflects the excess depreciation taken 
on assets. None of these were statistically significant or im- 
Table 4.3 
Independent Variable 
Form of  Payment in Merger: Logit Analysis 
Constant 
Tender offer 
Hostile tender offer 
Missing tender offer (post-1980) 
Stock new issue 
Stock repurchase 
Basis step-up 
Tax losses and credits 
Tax losses and credits  x  limit 
Basis step-up/Target assets 
Losses and credits x  limit/ 
Losses and credits x  limit/ 




(0.2  1  0) 




































Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* = significant at .05 level. 
Dependent variable  =  1 for stock transactions. 84  Alan J. AuerbacWDavid Reishus 
portant in explaining the form of payment. Only the results 
from the first version of this variable are shown in table 4.3. 
Likewise, the results for the tax saving due to use of losses 
and credits are not significant in explaining the form of pay- 
ment. This is true whether we use the straight gains from the 
tax variables, or a version which attempts to account for the 
legal limitations that are due to the relative sizes of target and 
parent in a reorganization. In general, the standard errors of 
the estimated coefficients render them insignificant, often with 
a sign opposite from that predicted. 
The variables which are significant in explaining the changes 
are the stock issuing or purchasing behavior of the acquiring 
firm in the period two years before the merger. A firm which 
has previously issued new stock in this period is more likely 
to use stock in the merger, and one that has retired stock is 
more likely to use cash. Also, if  a tender offer was used in 
the combination, cash is far more likely to be used as the 
means of payment. This is true even when we control for the 
hostility of  the transaction using dummy variables for man- 
agement resistance and the presence of multiple  bidder^.^ We 
do not have data on tender offers past 1980, and the dummy 
variable representing this period has a significant effect on the 
probability of cash being used, reflecting the increased use of 
cash in our sample after 1980. 
In summary, there is little evidence from the logit regres- 
sions that  the corporate  tax  effects  we have identified  are 
important in determining the form of the merger transaction. 
This does not imply that they are unimportant for the decision 
to merge. While the current results provide no strong support 
for taxes as an important motivation to merge, this can only 
be tested directly when merged firms are compared with firms 
that did not merge. 
Notes 
We  are grateful to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Na- 
tional Science Foundation, and the Institute for Law and Economics at the 
University of Pennsylvania for financial support. 85  The Impact of  Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.  Auerbach (1983) and Auerbach and Poterba (1987) find that taxpaying 
firms face a greater incentive to invest in machinery  and equipment than 
firms not paying taxes because of net operating loss deductions. 
Taking the two-year  average loss frequency of about 10 percent as 
applying to all firms in the sample,  one would  expect  19  percent of  the 
mergers to have at least one firm with a loss (10 percent targets plus  10 
percent parents minus  1 percent to correct for double counting when both 
have losses). The observed incidence of 8 out of 37 is only slightly above 
this percentage. 
We  are also aware, however, that baser theories of  management be- 
havior, such as “if  you’ve got it, spend it, if  you haven’t, issue stock” are 
also consistent with this finding. In general, it is difficult to distinguish the 
argument that internal funds are a cheaper source of capital for tax reasons 
from the argument that they are cheaper because managers need not subject 
themselves to the judgment of the market. 
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